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Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to collect sensitive proprietary information from private
fund advisers via Form PF. Prior studies suggest that the SEC’s mandated
collection of private fund data in Form PF created several core challenges
for the private fund industry and for the SEC. This Article presents the
results of a survey of SEC-registered investment advisers to private funds
after the SEC’s first mandatory collection of private fund data.
The key findings of this study indicate that the majority of private fund
advisers responding to the survey incurred less than $10,000 to prepare
their initial data reporting to the SEC, with the cost of subsequent annual
Form PF filings at about half the initial cost. Larger private fund advisers,
required to file quarterly, are faced with substantially higher compliance
costs, both for their initial data reporting and for subsequent quarterly
filings. The data analysis in this study affirms SEC cost estimates for
smaller private fund advisers’ Form PF compliance costs. The SEC appears
to have overestimated Form PF compliance costs for larger private fund
advisers.
While the data analysis in this study suggests that the overall effect of
private fund disclosure requirements on the private fund industry is
moderate, it also indicates that the data reporting requirements for private
funds and the corresponding SEC forms can be further improved. The
majority of SEC-registered private fund advisers identified the ambiguity of
Form PF data reporting requirements in Form PF as the most pressing issue.
However, the majority of respondents also considered their existing
reporting systems adequate for capturing the information required by the
SEC and agreed with the SEC’s definitions and instructions for Form PF.
Respondents predominately rated the SEC staff as sufficient or good at
providing guidance.
* Associate Professor, University of Saint Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis. The author
wishes to acknowledge the assistance of his colleagues, private fund advisers, the Managed Funds
Association, and the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Divisions of Investment
Management and Economic and Risk Analysis. Special thanks go to Roberta Romano, James
Lindgren, John Morley, Tamar Frankel, Bentley Anderson, Stuart Kaswell, Alan Palmiter, the
participants at the Midwestern Securities Litigation and Enforcement Forum, the participants at
the 6th liechtensteinische Fondstag at the University of Liechtenstein, and the participants at the
2014 Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Law and Economics Association. The author is also
grateful for outstanding research assistance from Nadine Ibrahim and Timothy Lacine and
research librarian Valerie Aggerbeck.
2015] The Effect of Private Fund Disclosures 429
I. INTRODUCTION
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and the SEC rules implementing the
requirements under Title IV created a paradigm shift for the regulation of
private funds in the United States, increasing regulatory oversight to
unprecedented levels. The new regulatory framework for private funds in
the United States requires private fund adviser registration and enhanced
disclosure of sensitive proprietary information.1 To facilitate appropriate
data collection for assessing systemic risks, the Dodd-Frank Act authorized
the SEC to promulgate rules requiring registration and enhanced disclosures
for private equity and private funds managers.2 To collect the required data,
the SEC Division of Investment Management adopted a new form, Form
PF.3
Private fund advisers have traditionally opposed enhanced transparency
of the funds they manage, arguing that the mandatory private fund
disclosure requirements in Form PF could inappropriately burden the
private fund industry. 4 Some of the most controversial disclosure
requirements in Form PF include: the reporting of risk metrics, strategies
and products used by the investment adviser and its funds, counterparties
and credit exposure, performance and changes in performance, financing
information, percentage of assets traded using algorithms, and the
percentage of fund assets held in equity and debt instruments.5
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§
401–402, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-20 nt, 80b-2 (2010)).
2. Id. §§ 402–408.
3. SEC, OMB NO. 3235-0679, FORM PF: REPORTING FORM FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS TO
PRIVATE FUNDS AND CERTAIN COMMODITY POOL OPERATORS AND COMMODITY TRADING
ADVISORS (2011) [hereinafter FORM PF], available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formpf.pdf; SEC, OMB NO. 3235-0049, FORM ADV: UNIFORM
APPLICATION FOR INVESTMENT ADVISER REGISTRATION AND REPORT FORM BY EXEMPT
REPORTING ADVISERS (2011) [hereinafter FORM ADV], available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv.pdf.
4. SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE FUNDS 90 (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf (“Many of those opposing required registration
expressed a strong preference for leaving the private fund industry ‘unregulated’.”); Stephen
Brown et al., Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge Fund
Registration, 63 J. FIN. 2785, 2789 (2008) (stating that when the SEC tried to change registration
rules in 2004, the changes were strongly opposed by private fund managers, “who argued that
completing the 35-page form was unnecessarily costly and burdensome”); Carol J. Loomis, Hard
Times Come to the Hedge Funds, FORTUNE, Jan. 1970, at 100 (arguing that the private fund
industry viewed the threat of SEC action as a deterrent to growth, and private fund managers in
the 1960s and 1970s disliked the thought of SEC regulation, dreading the “prospect of an SEC
move that would prevent them from earning their compensation in the traditional way”); Hedge
Fund Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. 26 (1998)
(statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board) (repeating Greenspan’s support
for continued loose regulation of the private fund industry).
5. Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool
Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
3,308 (Oct. 31, 2011), 76 Fed. Reg. 71,128 (Nov. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3308.pdf; FORMADV, supra note 3.
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Prior studies suggest that the SEC’s mandated collection of private fund
data in Form PF creates several core challenges for both the private fund
industry and the SEC.6
The SEC appears to be primarily concerned with the collection and
evaluation of the private fund data as well as the clarity and
understandability of the SEC’s Form PF guidance. The private fund
industry has identified other concerns pertaining to its attempts to comply
with the data reporting obligations, including: (1) understanding the
intended purpose of Form PF; (2) understanding the definitions and
instructions in Form PF; (3) the ease of interpreting Form PF questions; (4)
investment advisers’ lack of resources (staff, time, vendor costs) for
preparing Form PF; (5) the lack of, and the nature and extent of, SEC
guidance and support; (6) the time spent on filling out and filing Form PF;
(7) adequacy of existing internal reporting, monitoring, and tracking
systems for capturing the information required in Form PF; and (8) ability
to provide disclosures regarding counterparty credit exposure and collateral.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the SEC may be working with
contradictory, misleading, inaccurate, and incomplete data. Investment
advisers claim that the SEC is using industry terms incorrectly and
inconsistently. Others allege that many of the disclosure obligations in
Form PF do not pertain to their business or cannot be fulfilled other than by
guessing or by providing rough estimates. If these allegations are true, the
SEC’s ability to evaluate and assess the data could be compromised. The
use of incomplete and misleading data could lead to the development of
questionable policies and regulations as applied to the private fund industry.
This Article presents the results of a survey of private fund advisers
after the SEC’s adoption of Form PF.7 The survey was disseminated to
3,669 private fund advisers who registered with the SEC before the
applicable deadline. The author’s research team contacted the entire
population via a fax questionnaire and e-mail survey. After multiple
attempts to reach the entire population in over five months, respondents
([n=52]) (0.014%) answered questions in several categories designed to
identify the effectiveness of Form PF. The categories included: (1)
definitions and instructions in Form PF; (2) the need to interpret Form PF
questions; (3) priority of problems with Form PF; (4) advisers’
understanding of intended purpose of Form PF; (5) use of a service provider
6. Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 50 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 243, 315–16 (2013) [hereinafter Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration]; Wulf
A. Kaal, Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures in Bankruptcy, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
195 (2014) [hereinafter Kaal, Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures]; Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge
Fund Regulation via Basel III, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389 (2011) [hereinafter Kaal, Basel
III]; Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability, 28
ANN. REV. BANKING& FIN. L. 581 (2009) [hereinafter Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation].
7. This article predominantly considers SEC-registered investment managers to private funds
and private equity advisers but less so venture capital pools.
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to complete Form PF; (6) resources (staff, time, cost) allocated for filing
Form PF; (7) SEC guidance and support; (8) time spent on filing out and
filing Form PF; (9) adequacy of existing internal reporting, monitoring, and
tracking systems for capturing the information required on Form PF; (10)
disclosures regarding counterparty credit exposure and collateral difficulties
in identifying counterparties; (11) investors’ requests for copies of an
adviser’s Form PF filings; and (12) advisers substituting portions of
required CFTC forms with Form PF disclosures.
The survey identifies the core issues pertaining to private fund data
collection in Form PF and outlines possible solutions. The author tested all
survey questions in several rounds with representatives from the private
fund industry. The SEC also provided feedback on draft survey questions.
Cross-comparison of the feedback from both the SEC and the private fund
industry indicates that the survey questions are highly relevant and
succinctly address the main concerns with Form PF. Cross-comparison of
SEC and industry feedback also shows that both groups independently
identified the same pertinent issues with Form PF. In addition, both groups
suggested improvements for various survey questions. Accordingly, the
survey addresses concerns of both the private fund industry and the SEC.
While the majority of private fund advisers identified the ambiguity of
Form PF and the inefficiency of data reporting requirements as the most
pressing issues pertaining to Form PF, the majority of advisers also agreed
with the definitions and instructions that the SEC uses. Advisers generally
appreciated SEC guidance and flexibility, assessing the quality of guidance
as sufficient or good. The majority of respondents reported that they
incurred additional expenditures of less than $10,000 to prepare and file
their initial Form PF submission, and that the cost of subsequent annual
filings was about half the initial cost. Larger investment advisers to private
funds, however, incurred substantially larger compliance cost in fulfilling
the quarterly filing requirements under Form PF.
Part I of this Article introduces the history of and summarizes the
debate over the creation of private fund disclosure requirements. Part II
describes the legal requirements and private fund managers’ data collection
obligation under the Dodd-Frank Act and SEC Form PF. The author
provides anecdotal evidence from prior surveys suggesting that the data that
private funds report on Form PF creates several challenges for the SEC and
the private fund industry. Part III outlines the methodological approach of
the survey, introducing the survey instrument, data sources, sampling,
coding, and coding constraints. The author also evaluates possible selection
bias issues. Part IV discusses the results of the survey with descriptive
statistics. Part V presents the substantive results of the study in summary
graphs. Part VI summarizes the key findings and examines implications for
private fund policy, concluding that the data reporting requirements for
private funds and the corresponding SEC forms can be further improved.
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II. PRIVATE FUND TRANSPARENCY
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and the SEC’s rules implementing the
requirements under Title IV8 increased the level of regulatory oversight of
private funds to unprecedented levels9 by requiring registered investment
advisers to file periodic reports10 via SEC Form PF.11 Prior to the enactment
of Title IV, the private fund industry was largely exempt from regulatory
oversight, provided that private fund advisers complied with safe harbor
requirements under federal securities laws. 12 All registered investment
advisers holding more than $150 million in assets under management
(AUM) attributable to private funds at the end of their most recently
completed fiscal year are required to file Form PF with the SEC.13
8. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 401–416, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570–79 (2010) (incorporating the PFIARA in Title IV).
9. Id. Accord Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2004/39/EC and 2009/…/EC,
COM (2009) 207 final (Apr. 30, 2009); Investment Funds, EUR. COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/alternative_investments_en.htm (last updated Mar.
24, 2014) (providing additional materials on AIFM).
10. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 404(b); 17 C.F.R. §
275.204(b)-1 (2013); Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity
Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,128, 71,140–42
(Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-16/pdf/2011-28549.pdf.
11. FORM PF, supra note 3, at 2. See also 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1 (requiring private fund
advisers to file Form PF with the SEC periodically); Reporting by Investment Advisers, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 71,239; 17 C.F.R. § 4.27 (2013) (requiring private fund advisers to file Form PF if they are
registered as commodity pool operators or commodity trading advisers).
12. SEC proposed amending Regulation D, noting that inflation might have eroded the
significance of a $1 million net worth as a proxy for investor sophistication. See Prohibition of
Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private
Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 404–05 (Jan. 4, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275)
(proposing two steps for determining whether an investor would be accredited: (1) whether the
individual meets the test in rule 501(a) or rule 215 and (2) whether the individual “owns at least
$2.5 million in investments”). But see Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled
Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,756, 44,756 n.2 (Aug. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 275) (deferring consideration of proposed change to definition of “accredited investor”).
Before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, private funds and their investment advisers
were able to remain exempt from the securities laws as long as they limited the resale of their
securities, limited the sale of their securities to a limited number of accredited investors, and did
not advertise or otherwise hold themselves out to the public. See Kaal, Basel III, supra note 6, at
412–16 (summarizing private fund regulation requirements before the Dodd-Frank Act).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1; Reporting by Investment Advisers, 76 Fed. Reg. at 71,132–33
(listing three criteria for filing Form PF that represent an initial threshold for the minimal Form PF
requirements and stating that most private fund advisers who meet these three criteria will only be
required to file Section 1 of Form PF while “large private fund advisers” will be required to file
the remaining sections of Form PF); id. at 71,133 (explaining that there are three types of “large
private fund advisers:” (1) “[a]ny adviser having at least $1.5 billion in [Regulatory Assets Under
Management (RAUM)] attributable to private funds as of the end of any month in the prior fiscal
quarter;” (2) “[a]ny adviser managing a liquidity fund having at least $1 billion in combined
[RAUM] attributable to liquidity funds and registered money market funds as of the end of any
month in the prior fiscal quarter;” and (3) “[a]ny adviser having at least $2 billion in [RAUM]
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Form PF requires investment managers to disclose information about
themselves, about the funds they manage, and about their
investors. 14 Important Form PF disclosure requirements include a
breakdown of the net asset value (NAV) that the investment manager
manages,15 including the percentage of the reporting fund’s NAV that was
managed using high-frequency trading strategies. 16 Form PF requires
investment advisers to disclose the five trading counterparties to which the
reporting fund has the greatest net counterparty credit exposure,17 including
the dollar amount owed to each creditor. 18 Other important Form PF
disclosures include the requirement that the manager identify changes in
market factors and their effect on the long and short components of the
portfolio as a percentage of NAV, 19 any information about the
counterparties’ collateral and other credit support posted to the respective
reporting funds,20 as well as trading and clearing mechanisms subject to
liquidity constraints and the duration of those constraints.21
Form PF is also intended to improve the SEC’s understanding of
reporting funds’ liquidity, exposure, and assets. Accordingly, Form PF
requires investment advisers to disclose the time increments it would take to
liquidate a certain percentage of the reporting funds’ portfolio,22 the dollar
value of long and short positions in each asset class,23 the value of turnover
by asset class, 24 the types of creditors (including the market value of
borrowings),25 and the aggregate value of all derivative positions for each
advised fund.26 Finally, Form PF requires disclosure of the reporting fund’s
restrictions (if any) on investor withdrawals and redemptions27 and other
information pertaining to investor liquidity, such as the percentage of
NAV.28
attributable to private equity funds as of the last day of the adviser’s most recently completed
fiscal year.”).
14. See 17 C.F.R. § 279.9 (2013) (establishing filing requirements for Form PF); FORM PF,
supra note 3, § 1a–b.
15. FORM PF, supra note 3, § 1a, Item B.3 (including the following private fund categories: (a)
hedge funds, (b) liquidity funds, (c) private equity funds, (d) real estate funds, (e) securitized asset
funds, (f) venture capital funds, (g) other private funds, (h) funds and accounts other than private
funds).
16. Id. § 1c, Item B.21.
17. Id. § 1c, Items B.22–23.
18. Id. § 2b, Item D.47.
19. Id. § 2b, Item C.42.
20. Id. § 2b, Item B.36.
21. Id. § 1c, Item B.24.
22. Id. § 2b, Item B.32.
23. Id. § 2a, Item B.26; id. § 2b, Item B.30 (pertaining to investment advisers that advise more
than one private fund).
24. Id. § 2a, Item B.27.
25. Id. § 2d, Item D.43.
26. Id. § 2b, Item D.44.
27. Id. § 2b, Item E.49.
28. Id. § 2b, Item E.50.
434 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 9
In light of the highly sensitive nature of these required disclosures and
the complexity of the reporting requirements, Form PF created substantial
challenges for the private fund industry. For instance, Form PF requires
disclosure of counterparty credit exposure, which is sensitive information
that often cannot be readily determined by the individual fund managers.
While prior studies have acknowledged that the SEC’s mandated collection
of private fund data via Form PF created several core challenges for the
private fund industry, these studies do not sufficiently clarify the impact of
Form PF disclosure requirements on managers. 29 Anecdotal evidence
suggests that the SEC may be working with contradictory, misleading,
inaccurate, and incomplete data in Form PF, which impacts the SEC’s
ability to evaluate and assess the data. The use of incomplete and
misleading data could lead to questionable policy making and regulatory
decisions for the private fund industry.
III. METHODOLOGY
The author analyzed a sampling of individual investment advisers from
a population of investment advisers registered in the United States and
made statistical inferences about the population using the sample. The
author collected the data from electronic surveys and survey questionnaires
via email and fax, respectively. 30 No respondent received a financial
incentive to participate in the survey. The only incentive for private fund
advisers’ participation was the author’s promise to share the findings of the
survey.
To ensure the pertinence and accuracy of the survey instrument, the
author tested and retested the survey instrument in over twenty test runs
with industry experts, SEC representatives, and private fund managers.31
After each test phase, the author integrated substantial substantive feedback
from the SEC representatives, academics, and registered private fund
advisers. Throughout the test phase, the author trained a team of research
assistants to engage respondents and code responses. The author double-
checked coding for accuracy and internal consistency.
A. DATA SOURCES ANDCODING
To provide quantifiable support for specific issues with Form PF that
allows further empirical investigation, the author surveyed private fund
advisers in the United States who are subject to Form PF filing
29. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration, supra note 6; Kaal, Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk
Disclosures, supra note 6; Kaal, Basel III, supra note 6; Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation, supra note
6.
30. Mode effects are insignificant because each data collection method was based on the same
questionnaire and the author and his team of research assistants asked respondents the same
sequence of questions.
31. See infra app. Survey Instrument.
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requirements. The SEC’s Investment Adviser Registration Depository
(IARD) contains data pertaining to registered investment advisers who are
subject to the Form PF filing requirement. 32 To identify the relevant
population, the author downloaded a dataset from the IARD website
comprising investment adviser firms registered with the SEC, and applied a
predefined set of filters.
First, the author filtered the data set by Form ADV item 7.B, “Are you
an adviser to any private fund?” That filter decreased the dataset to 4,045
“Yes” responses and eleven nonresponses for a total of 4,056 firms.
Thereafter, the author organized the data by “Main Office” location
response, sorting by country. While the data set was arranged in order of
“Main Office Country,” the author also ascertained that the main office was
in the United States by filtering main office phone and main office fax
numbers, respectively, and removing the investment adviser firms with non-
U.S. phone and fax numbers, as well as any firms with phone or fax
numbers containing more than ten digits. Through process of elimination,
the author identified 3,728 advisers who were located in the United States
and had responded affirmatively to the SEC as advising private funds.
Subsequently, the author filtered for firms that completed the latest version
(October 2012) of Form ADV, identifying 3,669 firms. Thus, the filtered
and final dataset of 3,669 firms includes investment adviser firms that: 1)
advise private funds, 2) have U.S. contact information, and 3) completed
the October 2012 version of Form ADV.
The author used several different coding methodologies, such as close-
ended survey questions to quantify items. Close-ended questions were
dichotomous and continuous, and the available response options for close-
ended questions were mutually exclusive and exhaustive. For those
questions that allowed a “Yes” and “No” response, the author used a binary
code of “1” for “Yes” and “0” for “No.” The author also used open-ended
survey questions to assess several technically demanding Form PF issues.
The author coded responses to open-ended survey questions into response
clusters by assigning identification numbers to the respective response, thus
combining binary and clustered responses in one coding sheet. The
combined coding sheet facilitated a cross comparison of survey responses
from separate categories, as well as with other Form PF and Form ADV
data. The author and his research assistants approached all respondents
using the same methodology. All respondents volunteered their
participation, and the author had no control over the sample selection.
32. Historical Archive of Investment Adviser Reports, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/foia/iareports/inva-archive.htm (last modified Mar. 2, 2015). See also
Division of Investment Management: Electronic Filing for Investment Advisers on IARD, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/iard.shtml (last modified Aug. 9, 2013) (providing
information on the IARD and how to register or obtain information on investment advisers).
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B. SAMPLINGCONSTRAINTS
Empirical researchers analyzing private funds face many limitations
when conducting surveys. 33 Because of decades-old regulations that
allowed the industry to remain exempt from registration and transparency
requirements, and the private fund industry’s particular interest in
confidentiality and privacy, high quality private fund data is rather limited.
One promising way to overcome this limitation involves the collection of
the required data from private funds. However, private fund advisers’
privacy, performance, and idiosyncratic concerns also limit the researcher’s
ability to collect data for an effective sample size.34 The SEC’s efforts to
keep private both the e-mail contact information of filing entities and their
representatives further complicated the collection of private funds data.35
Accordingly, data collection for this study proved difficult. The
overwhelming majority of the population did not participate in the survey.
In addition to the aforementioned privacy and performance-related
limitations, the data collection for this study required private fund adviser
respondents to recall technical details and their individual filing history on
Form PF. Only in the rarest of circumstances did respondents revisit their
filing history to respond to the survey questions that required such
additional expertise. Several respondents voiced concern and/or uncertainty
about possible SEC enforcement measures pertaining to their Form PF
filings, which also may have affected the response rate of this study.
C. SELECTION BIAS
Selection bias in survey studies is the subject of a long-lasting and
ongoing debate amongst commentators in the field.36 Generally speaking,
sample selection bias exists if, rather than using randomly selected cases to
explain phenomena, researchers select cases because they display and share
33. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration, supra note 6, at 278–80.
34. Id. at 278 (“Private fund managers have a tendency to disfavor any form of public
exposure for a variety of economic, performance, privacy-related, and idiosyncratic reasons.
Given the particular concern in the private fund industry regarding confidentiality and privacy,
obtaining a substantial effective sample size for this study proved difficult.”).
35. Id. at 279 (“The author and his team of researchers encountered a number of problems
during the process of collecting survey responses. The identity and contact information for the
chief compliance officer and chief legal officer of the firms were not publicly available. Although
Form ADV requires advisers to disclose the contact information for their chief compliance officer,
the dataset provided by the SEC did not list this information and did not include e-mail addresses.
The filed copy of Form ADV on the IARD website also did not contain chief compliance officer
information. The dataset obtained from the SEC did not include the e-mail addresses, and neither
did the individual Form ADVs on the IARD website.”).
36. See Thomas W. Hall et al., The Effectiveness of Increasing Sample Size to Mitigate the
Influence of Population Characteristics in Haphazard Sampling, 20 AUDITING: J. PRAC. &
THEORY 169, 169 (2001).
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the very trait the researchers hope to explain.37 Factors resulting in selection
bias include the non-random selection of cases 38 and the drawing of
inferences that are not statistically representative of the population.39
Despite the drawbacks of selection biases, some scholars argue that
sample selection bias is merely a generic problem in social science research
designs involving a non-random sample of a population of interest. 40
Selection bias is considered a generic problem because human behavior
determines selection,41 and the assumptions about how selection occurs are
important for selection bias models.42 In fact, several social science research
traditions rely on empirical designs that are subject to sample selection
biases.43 There is some evidence that significant findings with substantial
37. See Barbara Geddes, How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection
Bias in Comparative Politics, 2 POL. ANALYSIS 131, 140 (1990).
38. See PETER JONES, STATISTICAL SAMPLING AND RISK ANALYSIS IN AUDITING 11–12
(1999); DONALD A. LESLIE ET AL., DOLLAR-UNIT SAMPLING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
AUDITORS 36–37 (1980); ARTHUR J. WILBURN, PRACTICAL STATISTICAL SAMPLING FOR
AUDITORS 4–6 (1984); Herbert Arkin, Statistical Sampling in Auditing, 27 N.Y. CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCT. 454, 457 (1957); W. Edwards Deming, On the Contributions of Standards of Sampling to
Legal Evidence and Accounting, 19 CURRENT BUS. STUD. 14, 18–21 (1954); Thomas W. Hall et
al., The Use of and Selection Biases Associated with Nonstatistical Sampling in Auditing, 12
BEHAV. RES. ACCT. 231, 232–33 (2000); Clive S. Lennox et al., Selection Models in Accounting
Research, 87 ACCT. REV. 589, 611 (2012); Jennifer Wu Tucker, Selection Bias and Econometric
Remedies in Accounting and Finance Research, 29 J. ACCT. LITERATURE 31, 32 (2010); Neal B.
Hitzig, Statistical Sampling Revisited, CPA J., May 2004, at 30, available at
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/504/essentials/p30.htm; Thomas Hall et al., Haphazard
Selection: Is It Time to Change Audit Standards? 1, 3–4 (Working Paper, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1687443.
39. Richard A. Berk, An Introduction to Sample Selection Bias in Sociological Data, 48 AM.
SOC. REV. 386, 391 (1983); David Collier, Translating Quantitative Methods for Qualitative
Researchers: The Case of Selection Bias, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 461, 462 (1995).
40. See Christopher Winship & Robert D. Mare, Models for Sample Selection Bias, 18 ANN.
REV. SOC. 327, 328 (1992).
41. See generally Reuben Gronau, Wage Comparisons—A Selectivity Bias, 82 J. POL. ECON.
1119 (1974); James J. Heckman & Guilherme Sedlacek, Heterogeneity, Aggregation, and Market
Wage Functions: An Empirical Model of Self-Selection in the Labor Market, 93 J. POL. ECON.
1077 (1985); James J. Heckman & Guilherme L. Sedlacek, Self-Selection and the Distribution of
Hourly Wages, 8 J. LAB. ECON. S329 (1990); James J. Heckman & Bo Honoré, The Empirical
Content of the Roy Model, 58 ECONOMETRICA 1121 (1990); H. Gregg Lewis, Comments on
Selectivity Biases in Wage Comparisons, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1145 (1974); A.D. Roy, Some Thoughts
on the Distribution of Earnings, 3 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 135 (1951); Robert J. Willis &
Sherwin Rosen, Education and Self-Selection, 87 J. POL. ECON. S7 (1979).
42. See generally DRAWING INFERENCES FROM SELF-SELECTED SAMPLES (Howard Wainer
ed., 1986); NONPARAMETRIC AND SEMIPARAMETRIC METHODS IN ECONOMETRICS AND
STATISTICS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM IN ECONOMIC THEORY
AND ECONOMETRICS (William A. Barnett et al. eds., 1991); Arthur S. Goldberger, Abnormal
Selection Bias, in STUDIES IN ECONOMETRICS, TIME SERIES, ANDMULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 67
(Samuel Karlin et al. eds., 1983); Lung-Fei Lee, Some Approaches to the Correction of Selectivity
Bias, 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 355 (1982); Abbas Arabmazar & Peter Schmidt, Note, An
Investigation of the Robustness of the Tobit Estimators to Non-Normality, 50 ECONOMETRICA
1055, 1055 (1982).
43. See RICHARD L. RATLIFF ET AL., INTERNALAUDITING: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 628
(2d ed. 1996).
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policy implications can be ignored if researchers rely exclusively on
observational schemes that are free from selection bias.44 Several studies
used simulation techniques to review the effectiveness of techniques used to
prevent selection bias. These studies suggest that under ordinary
circumstances, many of the techniques used to prevent selection bias
problems skew results, have mixed success rates, and can actually worsen
rather than improve estimates. 45 Increasing the sample size neither
necessarily compensates for the potential selection bias of non-statistical
techniques, nor guarantees the representativeness of the sample.46
For purposes of this study, the author identified the population of
private fund advisers who were subject to the disclosure requirements of the
Dodd-Frank Act using the SEC’s IARD database. 47 To ensure a
representative sample, the author chose respondents who were private fund
advisers and registered with the SEC as identified on the IARD database.
The author did not select the survey sample participants and did not use
probabilistic randomizing aids for purposes of the sample selection. It
would not have been feasible to further randomize the sample by including
respondents from outside of the private fund industry or respondents other
than private fund advisers because those non-adviser respondents would not
have been exposed to the new disclosure requirements. Each member of the
identified population of private fund advisers had a known, nonzero chance
of being selected as part of the sample. All respondents were approached
using the same methodology and were volunteer participants. While the
author recognizes that obtaining information through voluntary responses
can create an inherent bias because people with a special interest are more
likely to respond, no indicia exist that respondents who did respond to the
survey were different from individuals who did not respond. The dispersion
of responses suggests that respondents did not have a special interest in
responding. Common characteristics of respondents include experience
with private fund disclosure requirements in Form PF and a willingness to
share their experiences.
44. Id.
45. See Ross M. Stolzenberg & Daniel A. Relles, Tools for Intuition About Sample Selection
Bias and Its Correction, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 494, 494 (1997).
46. See DANM. GUY ET AL., PRACTITIONER’SGUIDE TOAUDIT SAMPLING 160 (1998).
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methodologies. 61 Another respondent suggested that assessing the risk
profile could have been done with significantly less detail and effort by
employing the due diligence processes utilized by many institutional
investors when considering whether to allocate capital to a private fund
manager. The aggregation of data in Form PF Question 2a also raised
concerns. 62 One respondent suggested that if a fund does not employ
leverage, then the fund’s manager should not have to provide further data.
Other items that were marked as problematic and difficult to measure
include Section 1b, Item B, #8, 7.B.(1), Form PF Questions 20, 24, and 28.
Question 8b, the follow-up question to Question 8a, asked, “What
questions should have been asked instead and why?” Responses in this
category were also widely dispersed and did not justify clustering. Several
respondents, however, made comments in the context of limiting systemic
risk via Form PF. These respondents suggested that the SEC’s objective of
limiting systemic risk could have been more strongly advanced by asking
questions in Form PF with an emphasis on open derivatives positions,63
total market exposure of the entity, and total underlying capital. 64 One
respondent argued that Form PF Question 20, pertaining to a reporting
fund’s investment strategies, could have been categorized better in light of
some managers having multiple strategies and sub-strategies. This
respondent, emphasizing the importance of conforming Form PF to widely
accepted investor reporting, suggested that the Form should provide a
“breakout of assets by product type, geography, counterparty, sectors—
similar to widely accepted investor reporting.” Finally, one respondent
61. More specifically, one respondent opined that “we (does he mean his firm? Him as an
adviser?) don’t usually calculate this information for our investors in this manner—so we had to
calculate it specifically for the form,” and that
this is not an accurate indicator of anything—in fact it is entirely possible that the
reporting entity is not able to provide such information as it is not useful to their
investors—who are far more concerned about the performance of the Fund net any
costs that under USGAAP cannot be included.
62. One respondent suggested that “2a requires that the information be aggregated, and later
the information is required to be provided separately for certain funds. Why not just require the
information to be provided by fund, and then the SEC can aggregate the data as they deem
necessary.”
63. One respondent stated that
the first question that should have been asked is #13 on Section 1(b), Does the fund
have open derivatives positions? If they answer is no [sic], Form PF should not have to
be completed. Without derivative positions, I don’t see how the SEC can link firms to a
systemic collapse.
64. One respondent opined that “the Form should have simply approached the ultimate
question in a different way. If the goal was to determine exposure/leverage in the market and thus
systemic risk associated with these entities, simply ask the total market exposure of the entity and
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VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The SEC’s mandatory initial collection of private fund data raised many
concerns for the private fund industry. This Article presents the results of a
survey with private fund advisers intended to ascertain the effects of the
mandated private fund disclosures.
A. SUMMARY OFKEY FINDINGS
The key findings of this study quantify, evaluate, and clarify many core
open issues with respect to the SEC’s efforts to collect private fund data
through Form PF, including in relation to: (1) the required resources for
completing Form PF, (2) the shortcomings of and SEC guidance on Form
PF, (3) the adequacy of filers’ reporting systems and service providers, and
(4) the issues associated with investor relations.
1. Purpose and Required Resources
Respondents identified the SEC’s objective of assessing systemic risk
and the historical lack of private fund information provided by the industry
to the SEC as the primary purposes of Form PF disclosure requirements.
Commenters also argued that FSOC and OFR monitoring of risk,
investment adviser examinations, and the collection of risk exposure
information were important purposes in the enactment of Form PF.
The completion and filing of Form PF requires the commitment of
resources from, and expenditures by, the private fund industry. A majority
of respondents (59.18%) stated that the additional expenditures required to
complete and file Form PF for the first time were under $10,000. A
majority of commenters (57.14%) identified the cost of subsequent annual
Form PF filings at about half of the first-time filing cost, i.e., around
$5,000. A breakdown of respondents by assets under management suggests
that larger private fund advisers, required to file quarterly, are faced with
substantially higher compliance costs, both for their initial data reporting
and for subsequent quarterly filings. The data does not identify the long-
term costs for the private fund industry of having to complete and file Form
PF on an annual or quarterly basis.
The overall expenses necessary to complete and file Form PF
correspond with resource requirements, such as the staff required to file
Form PF and the total number of hours it took to complete Form PF. A
majority of respondents (67.35%) used only one to three individuals to
complete Form PF. Similarly, a majority of respondents (69.39%) indicated
that it took staff less than 50 hours to complete Form PF.
Quoting data-gathering efforts as well as the data options and the
ambiguity of the respective Form PF questions, respondents identified
several Questions on Form PF as particularly time-consuming, including,
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Form PF Questions 7 (related persons), 16 (types of investors), and 17
(performance).
2. Shortcomings and SEC Guidance
This survey may help policy-makers optimize Form PF and the
relevancy of the guidance they provide, as the survey identifies
shortcomings in the design, definitions, and guidance of Form PF.
Respondents identified the burdensome nature and the ambiguity of Form
PF as the most pressing issues. While a majority of respondents (59.18%)
agreed with the definitions or instructions in Form PF, respondents
nevertheless argued that performance measures in Form PF Question 17, as
well as counterparties and definitions of counterparties in Form PF
Questions 22 and 23, required a level of interpretation. The minority of
respondents (40.82%) who disagreed with the definitions or instructions in
Form PF generally disagreed with the definition of the term “funds” in
Form PF. Commenters were equally split on whether Form PF questions
pertaining to calculating RAUM required filers to interpret RAUM for
purposes of completing Form PF.
Most respondents appreciated both SEC guidance and SEC flexibility
in responding to questions regarding Form PF. A majority of respondents
rated SEC guidance in the context of their Form PF completion as sufficient
or good. The majority of the commenters who believed that SEC guidance
was inadequate indicated that SEC guidance was particularly unclear with
respect to Form PF Section 1c, Item B (regarding Reporting Funds). This is
consistent with the responses that disagreed with the definition of funds in
Form PF. Most respondents (72.92%) agreed that the SEC’s flexibility in
answering questions with respect to Form PF was helpful. Commenters
stated that SEC flexibility was valuable because it enabled respondents to
interpret Form PF, it increased respondents’ ability to use their own internal
methodologies, it helped them articulate their own assumptions, it clarified
a lot of questions, and it simplified the completion of Form PF.
Nevertheless, the results shows that improvements to Form PF are
necessary to overcome its ambiguities.
3. Reporting Systems and Service Providers
This survey also identifies the adequacy of private funds’ existing
reporting systems utilized to capture the information required in Form PF.
A majority of respondents (65.22%) stated that their existing internal
reporting systems adequately capture the information required by Form PF.
More specifically, the majority of respondents did not encounter difficulties
in identifying data responsive to questions about counterparty credit
exposure, by using counterparties’ names on trading and/or legal records.
Several respondents (34.78%) opined that their existing internal reporting
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systems were insufficient to respond to questions on Form PF because they
require further analysis and calculations.
Respondents not only predominantly believed that their existing
internal reporting systems sufficed to complete Form PF, they also largely
(72.92%) abstained from employing a service-provider to complete Form
PF. Firms’ ability to use existing internal reporting systems to complete
Form PF is consistent with firms’ preference for completing Form PF in-
house. A majority of respondents actually suggested that Form PF can be
completed in-house. Others opined that completing Form PF would not
justify the expense of hiring a service-provider. Commenters identified
several challenges of working with a service-provider, including the
investment of time and expenses to develop processes, as well as the burden
of providing service-providers with the required information. The minority
of respondents who hired a service-provider stated they did so because of
(1) the difficulties in aggregating the data and entering it directly without
having an internal system in place to assist in the process; (2) the service
providers’ knowledge and their industry insight into answer methodology;
(3) a desire to ensure consistency in preparation; and (4) the burden of how
long it would take to complete Form PF in-house.
4. Investor Relations
For a variety of reasons, investors in private funds may ask for a copy
of the investment adviser’s Form PF filings. The majority of respondents
(74.47%) in the sample had not been asked to provide a copy of their Form
PF filing to their investors. While investment advisers may not volunteer
the information, the survey results indicate that they tend to allow investors
to review their Form PF filings in-house.
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURERESEARCH
The primary limitations for this study were (1) the availability of data
and (2) the somewhat narrower timeframe to complete the study after the
introduction of private fund reporting requirements. The author collected
the data during a six month time period after the effective date of the initial
filing requirement applicable to private funds. Further research may be
needed to determine if the long-term impact of private fund adviser
disclosure obligations is as moderate as this study suggests. More
specifically, while the cost implications for some advisers in preparing
Form PF seem reasonable at under $10,000 (for most smaller advisers but
not for larger private fund advisers) and with the cost for those smaller
advisers of subsequent annual Form PF filings at less than $5,000, the data
do not identify the long-term cost of Form PF filings for the private fund
industry.
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The findings of this study suggest that the overall effect of Form PF
data reporting requirements on the private fund industry may be less severe
than widely expected. In light of the cost data provided by this study (for
both smaller and larger private fund advisers),65 the industry’s concerns that
mandatory private fund adviser registration and disclosure requirements
could inappropriately burden investment advisers 66 seem to be mostly
unfounded. The results of this study complement findings in earlier studies
that suggest “the private fund industry [is] adjusting well, and the impact of
the registration and disclosure rules appears to be much less intense than the
industry initially anticipated.”67
Nevertheless, the data analysis and the findings of this study indicate
that there are several areas of concern with existing Form PF questions and
requirements. Important issues include the ambiguity of several key
questions in Form PF; the time constraints required to answer certain
questions, such as Questions 7 (related persons), 16 (types of investors),
and 17 (performance); respondents’ disagreement with the definition of
funds; and the lack of adequate SEC guidance for Section 1c, Item B
(information regarding reporting fund). Other issues identified in this study
pertain to the insufficiency of existing reporting systems for some firms;
difficulties in aggregating the required Form PF data and entering it directly
without the availability of a system to assist in the process; and challenges
in working with a service-provider, such as process development and the
burden of providing service-providers with the required information.
By examining these shortcomings in the existing framework for private
fund advisers’ data reporting, policymakers may be able to identify possible
policy improvements. Most of the problems may be addressed over time as
the SEC provides additional and improved guidance on Form PF or revises
core questions and/or the definitions pertaining to core questions that have
been identified as problematic. A possible remedy to the shortcomings that
advisers identified would be to standardize private fund adviser reporting
obligations. Standardization may help address the ambiguities and
inefficiencies that currently exist in the reporting requirements and may
help simplify and streamline the disclosure requirements for the private
fund industry. In any attempt at standardization of Form PF, policy-makers
should evaluate the competing needs of different types of private fund
advisers.
65. See supra figs. 10–13.
66. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
67. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration, supra note 6, at 316.
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VII. APPENDIX: SURVEY INSTRUMENT
To: Chief Legal / Compliance Officer
To Whom It May Concern
July 15, 2013
RE: Participant Understanding of Participation in the Survey
Dear Sir or Madame,
The purpose of this survey is for Professor Wulf A. Kaal at the
University of St. Thomas School of Law in Minneapolis to learn more
about your experiences in dealing with recent private fund registration and
disclosure requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act and in particular your
experiences in providing the SEC with required information under Form
PF.
As you may know, the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the SEC to
promulgate rules requiring registration and enhanced disclosure for private
fund managers. As part of the new rules, the SEC introduced a reporting
obligation under Form PF. The effects of private fund registration and
disclosure requirements in the United States are unclear and this survey
study hopes to evaluate and clarify possible effects.
To ensure that we reduce any risks in your participation, we will not in
any form identify you or your firm in any of our reports. Responses to this
survey will be used by Professor Kaal in several academic publications,
which will be made available to academics, industry experts (including
survey respondents), and regulators as well as to the general public at the
time of publication. Respondents’ identities will not be disclosed and
particular responses to this survey will not be linked to particular
respondents.
We would be happy to share the survey results with you, as they may
prove to be informative in the administrative management of your
fund(s). The collected cost data in the aggregate form will allow
respondents to compare costs. If deemed desirable and only with your
consent, we would also be happy to share the results of this survey with
your investors.
Answering the survey questions below will take approximately ten to
fifteen minutes. We do very much appreciate your support. Please do not
hesitate to get in touch with any questions.
With best regards,
Wulf A. Kaal
Associate Professor of Law
Private fund
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1. Did you assist in completing and/or file Form PF on behalf of the




2. Please check which section(s) of Form PF you completed:
a. 1a & 1b – All private fund advisers ____
b. 1c – All private fund advisers that advise private funds ____
c. 2a – Large private fund advisers (>$1.5 bil. AUM) ____
d. 2b – Large private fund advisers (>$1.5 bil. AUM) ____
e. 3 – Large liquidity fund advisers (>$1 bil. AUM) ____
f. 4 – Large private equity advisers (>$2 bil. AUM) ____
g. 5 – Temporary hardship exemption ____
3. Are you required to file Form PF?:
a. Annually ____
b. Quarterly ____
4. Please check all of the types of private funds that your investment
adviser firm manages (please only check those that apply best to you):
a. Private fund ____
b. Liquidity Fund ____
c. Private Equity Fund ____
d. Real Estate Fund ____
e. Securitized Asset Fund ____
f. Venture Capital ____
g. Other Private Fund ____
5. Which, if any, of the questions in Form PF required the greatest level of
interpretation?
_____________________________________________________________
6. Are there definitions or instructions in Form PF that you disagree with?
a. No ____
b. Yes ____
i. If yes – What definitions or instructions do you disagree with?
_____________________________________________________________
ii. Why do you disagree with the definition or instruction?
_____________________________________________________________
7. Please comment on the SEC guidance pertaining to Form PF:
a. Is the flexibility provided by the SEC in filling out Form PF
helpful?
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i. Yes ____If Yes – why? ___________________________________
ii. No ____If No – why not? _________________________________
b. When the SEC is prescriptive in its Form PF guidance do you agree
with the stance the SEC is taking?
i. Yes ____
ii. No ____If No – why not? _________________________________
8. Please comment on specific questions in Form PF:
a. What question in Form PF should not have been asked and why
not? _________________________________________________________
b. What questions should have been asked instead and why?
_________________________________________________________
9. What is the most pressing issue the SEC should address in the context
of Form PF?
_________________________________________________________
10. In your opinion, what is the purpose of Form PF? Please check all that
apply and/or provide additional comments:
a. Ease the burden on private fund managers to produce data ___
b. Assess systemic risk posed by the private fund industry ___
c. Allow the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the
Office of Financial Research (OFR) to monitor risks to the U.S. Financial
System ___
d. Address the lack of private fund information available to regulators
___




11. Are you using a service provider to complete Form PF (Y/N)?
_________________
a. If No – why not? ______________________________________
b. If Yes ___
i. Why are you using a service provider? _____________________
ii. Are there any issues with using service providers? Please explain:
_____________________________________________________________
12. Please estimate the following pertaining to your investment adviser
firm:
a. Total number of people who worked to complete Form PF for the
first time (including external consultants) __________________
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b. Total number of hours to complete Form PF for the first time
____________________
c. Total amount of funds spent to complete Form PF for the first time
$____________________
d. Please estimate the annual cost for subsequent Form PF filings
(after the first time filing) $___________________
13. SEC guidance and support:
a. On a scale of 1 – 5, how would you rate the best level of guidance





v. No Guidance ____
b. Which Sections / Items on Form PF were not adequately captured
by SEC guidance? Please list all relevant Sections / Items:
_________________________________________________________
14. Which question(s) on Form PF were most time consuming to answer?









15. Did your existing reporting, monitoring, and tracking systems
adequately capture the information required on Form PF?
a. Yes ____
b. No ____ If No – why not? ________________________________
c. If your existing reporting systems did not adequately capture the
information required on Form PF, how did you obtain the information
necessary to report the data to the SEC?
_____________________________________________________________
16. Form PF requires disclosures regarding counterparty credit exposure
and collateral [(Section 1(b) Item B, Numbers 22, 23, and Section 2(a)
Numbers 36, 37, and 38)].
a. How did you identify the relevant counterparties?
_____________________________________________________________
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b. Did you encounter any difficulties in identifying counterparties?
i. No ____
ii. Yes ____ If Yes – what difficulties did you encounter?
_________________________________________________________
17. Have your investors asked to obtain your Form PF filing?
a. No ____
b. Yes ____ If Yes – are you providing your Form PF filing to
investors?
i. Yes ____ If Yes – why are you providing investors with your Form
PF filings? ___________________________________________________
ii. No ____ If No – why not?_________________________________
18. To the extent permissible, are you using Form PF as a substitute form
for required CFTC forms?
a. No ____
b. Yes ____ If Yes – why? __________________________________
19. Did reporting “Regulatory AUM” as required in Form PF require a
level of interpretation from you?
a. No ____
b. Yes ____
i. If Yes – why? __________________________________________
ii. If Yes – how? __________________________________________
